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Subjective expected pleasure theory
Action effect
A B S T R A C T
Decisions often produce considerable levels of doubt and regret, yet little is known about how these experiences
are related. In six sets of studies (and two pilot-studies; total N=2268), we consistently find that doubts arising
after a decision (i.e., when people start questioning whether they made the correct decision) intensify regret via
increased feelings of blame for having made a poor choice. These results are consistent with decision justification
theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) and regret regulation theory (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), yet inconsistent
with subjective expected pleasure theory (SEP; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999). That is, SEP would have
predicted less regret as those who already doubted their decision should be less surprised when learning that
their decision indeed could have been better (as compared to those who were certain that they made the correct
decision). We find mixed results for the effect of post-decisional doubt on the experience of relief and no support
for a relationship between a person’s degree of doubt before a decision and the intensity of regret. Implications
and future directions are discussed.
1. Introduction
Most people readily recognize that decisions often produce con-
siderable levels of doubt and regret: we are conflicted which option to
choose before reaching a decision, we start doubting whether we made
the correct decision afterwards, and we feel regret when learning that
the outcome could have been better if we had chosen differently.
Although doubt and regret often accompany one another, little is
known about how these experiences are related. Do we regret our
choices more or less after an instance of doubt? When and why would
doubt affect the experience of regret? The goal of this research is to
provide more insight into these matters.
Regret is a universal human emotion, experienced similarly in dif-
ferent cultures (Breugelmans, Zeelenberg, Gilovich, Huang, & Shani,
2014). Regret is the unpleasant feeling when realizing that the outcome
could have been better if we had chosen the alternative course of ac-
tion. As such, regret is felt most intense when there is full knowledge of
the outcomes obtained and forgone, a conjecture already noted by Bell
(1983) who argued that “key to the identification of regret as a factor in
decision making under uncertainty is the hypothesis that it may matter
whether a foregone lottery is resolved or not.” (p. 1165). Many studies
have focused upon testing this resolution and found that decision ma-
kers indeed anticipate and experience regret most intense when they
learn the outcome of both the chosen and the forgone option (e.g., Boles
& Messick, 1995; Coricelli, et al., 2005; Larrick & Boles, 1995; Ritov,
1996; Ritov & Baron, 1995; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005; Zeelenberg,
Beattie, Van der Pligt & De Vries, 1996).
Regret is also a frequently experienced and expressed emotion. For
example, by analyzing audio-taped conversations of 26 dyads,
Shimanoff (1985) found that regret was the most frequently named
negative emotion in everyday conversations and we obtained similar
findings when analyzing more modern forms of communication. Spe-
cifically, when we monitored all English twitter conversations for
30 days and analyzed how frequent people expressed the emotions re-
gret and disappointment (two prototypical decision-related emotions),
people tweeted about regret most frequently (1.306.624 tweets) while
the emotion disappointment was mentioned only 270.215 times.1
Because regret is such an ubiquitous and aversive emotion, (antici-
pated) regret affects decisions in a variety of domains like financial deci-
sion making (De Bondt & Thaler, 1995; Strahilevitz, Odean, & Barber,
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2011), negotiations (Larrick & Boles, 1995), trust decisions (Martinez &
Zeelenberg, 2015), and even decisions about whether to participate in a
lottery or not (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). In a similar vein, research has
identified (anticipated) regret as an important mechanism in explaining
why individuals and organizations persist to invest resources in failing
courses of action (Wong & Kwong, 2007; Ku, 2008). Given the impact of
regret on organizational- and daily life decisions, it is important to further
develop our insight into the psychology of regret. The present article tries
to enhance our understanding of regret by investigating how it is related to
another prevalent decision-related experience: doubt.
2. Decisional doubt
Doubt refers to the subjective uncertainty that people experience
when assessing the correctness of their decisions, beliefs, or opinions
and in the context of decision-making it is useful to distinguish between
two different instances of doubt. The first type concerns the doubt that
arises before reaching a decision, which we refer to as ‘pre-decisional
doubt’. When choosing between multiple choice options, people often
feel conflicted which option to choose as they are uncertain which
choice alternative provides the best utility. The second type of doubt
concerns the doubt that emerges after having made a decision, but
before the outcome is known - we will refer to this as ‘post-decisional
doubt’. This type of doubt pertains to those instances when people start
questioning the correctness of their decision after having committed to
one of the choice options (but before knowing the actual decision
outcome). Although we explore in detail whether the first type of doubt
(i.e., pre-decisional doubt) affects the intensity of a person’s regret, we
primarily elaborate in the introduction on understanding the relation-
ship between post-decisional doubt and regret. This narrow focus stems
in part from the following two reasons. First, we tested in several stu-
dies whether pre-decisional doubt affects the intensity of regret but find
no support for a relationship. We address this (null) finding in depth in
the General Discussion. Second, and perhaps more important, doubt is
typically experienced when a contradictory argument becomes avail-
able that challenges the correctness of one’s decisions, beliefs, or opi-
nions. For example, after deciding to trust a person, thoughts may be-
come available (issued by oneself or somebody else) that undermines
the correctness of one’s decision, rendering a state of doubt. As such,
doubt is thus typically experienced after having selected a choice op-
tion2 and the results of our first study support this conjecture as deci-
sion makers indeed indicated that they experienced more doubt after
having made a decision (as opposed to before). In the remainder of the
introduction, we therefore focus in more detail on explaining how post-
decisional doubt is believed to affect the experience of regret.
2.1. Antecedents of post-decisional doubt.
Although not much is known about the consequences of post-deci-
sional doubt on behavior and emotions, various streams of research might
be informative about its antecedents. For example, in the domain of social
decision-making, Heath and Gonzalez (1995) found that decision makers
who interacted with others prior to reaching a decision felt more certain
about the correctness of their decision than those who were unable to
consult with others. In the domain of financial decision-making, Estes and
Hosseini (1988) established that (1) gender, (2) familiarity with investing
in financial markets, (3) college credit hours in accounting and finance, (4)
experience in evaluating stocks, and (5) the amount invested were sig-
nificantly associated with a person’s degree of confidence (or lack of
doubt) after an investment decision. Finally, in understanding the cogni-
tive mechanisms of decision-making, Kiani, Corthell, and Shadlen (2014)
found that a person’s degree of decision certainty was significantly cor-
related with the time a decision maker needed to reach a decision (i.e.,
longer decision times were associated with lower decision certainty rat-
ings). In sum, prior research in social-, financial-, and cognitive decision
making has identified various situational and personal determinants of a
person’s degree of post-decisional certainty (or lack of doubt). However,
while we may know what factors affect a decision-maker’s degree of
certainty or doubt in one’s decision, there is not much insight into its
consequences on subsequent behaviors and especially emotions. In what
follows, we articulate how different theories of emotions and decision-
making may be interpreted to predict how an instance of post-decisional
doubt affects the experience of regret.
2.2. Consequences of post-decisional doubt on the experience of regret.
The lack of research attention for the consequences of post-deci-
sional doubt is consistent with the observation that research in deci-
sion-making and emotions has primarily focused on two distinct phases
in the decision-making process: a pre-decisional phase in which the
choice options are compared before making a decision, and a post-out-
come phase in which the consequences of the decision are known
(Kirkebøen & Teigen, 2011). However, the intermediate phase (i.e., the
time period between a decision and the outcome) has largely been ig-
nored even though decisions and the outcomes stemming from these
decisions are often separated from each other by a certain time period.
For example, a person’s decision to invest in the stock market today
usually implies she has to wait to find out whether it was a good in-
vestment. Even for decisions for which the outcomes are quickly rea-
lized (such as playing roulette), choices and outcomes are separated by
a brief period of time. Yet, although the intermediate phase is common,
research only recently began to explore how events during this period
affect a person’s emotional reaction to the outcome. For example,
Kirkebøen, Vasaasen, & Teigen (2013) recently found that individuals
who chose to revise their decision during these time periods (from a
correct to a wrong option) regretted their choice more than those who
selected the wrong option directly (see also, Kirkebøen & Teigen, 2011;
Kruger, Wirtz, & Miller, 2005). Here we argue that even a brief instance
of doubt during this period can affect the intensity of a person’s regret.
At this point, it might be useful to distinguish more clearly how
post-decisional doubt differs from regret as both are experienced after a
decision is made. First, there is typically a temporal difference.
Specifically, post-decisional doubt is felt after making a decision, but
before the outcomes are known. During this phase, decision makers are
still uncertain about what the outcome will be (and whether they made
a correct decision or not). Regret, on the other hand, is felt when people
realize that they made a mistake (Breugelmans et al., 2014; Roseman,
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998). This
is typically when the outcomes of both the chosen alternative and the
foregone alternative are revealed (e.g., Boles & Messick, 1995; Coricelli
et al., 2005; Larrick & Boles, 1995; Ritov, 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1995;
Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005; Zeelenberg et al., 1996). Note that it is
possible to feel regret in the intermediate phase when decision makers
are already convinced that they made a mistake before learning the
actual outcome (see Kirkebøen & Teigen, 2011 who refer to this as pre-
outcome regret). We address this possibility in depth in Study 3 in
which we find that post-decisional doubt affects a person’s level of re-
gret above and beyond any feelings of pre-outcome regret.
In order to clarify the difference between post-decisional doubt and
regret in more depth, and to ascertain that these differences are not
only temporal, but also experiential in nature, we started with a simple
two-group pilot-study on Amazon Mechanical Turk3 (109 males, 92
females; Mage= 35.63, SD=10.27). More specifically, we asked
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
3 The use of internet samples has become a common practice in psychological
research. Importantly, it has repeatedly been demonstrated that MTurk parti-
cipants are equally reliable than lab participants while providing greater di-
versity (e.g., Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).
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participants to give a detailed description of a situation in which they
either started doubting (N=101) or regretting (N=100) a decision
they made. After providing this description, participants indicated for
various statements how accurately each statement described their re-
spective experience (1=Not at all accurate; 7= Very accurate). These
items were intended to pick up the experiential content of the two
constructs and examine their discriminant validity (cf., Breugelmans
et al., 2014; Roseman et al., 1994).4 The results (see Table 1) reveal that
post-decisional doubt and regret are markedly different experiences.
Participants in the post-decisional doubt condition scored significantly
higher on (1) repeatedly wondering whether one made the right deci-
sion, (2) the unsettling feeling of not knowing for sure, and (3) being
driven crazy by the uncertainty. Those in the regret condition, on the
other hand, scored significantly higher on (1) feeling a tendency to kick
oneself, (2) being clear that they made a mistake, (3) repeatedly
blaming themselves for the mistake they made, and (4) wishing for a
second chance. The results of this pilot study provides strong support
for the conjecture that post-decisional doubt and regret are experienced
differently. More specifically, while post-decisional doubt is char-
acterized by feeling uncertain about the correctness of one’s decision,
regret is defined by knowing for certain that one has made a mistake
(offsetting the aversive feeling and behavioral tendencies). Note that
none of the participants in the regret condition mentioned the word
doubt in their writings, and only 12 out of the 101 in the post-decisional
doubt condition used the word regret, 5 providing further support for
the difference between these two constructs. In what follows, we build
upon these initial findings and examine how doubt during the post-
decisional phase can affect the intensity of regret in the post-outcome
period when learning that the outcome could have been better.
To understand why and how post-decisional doubt affects the in-
tensity of regret, we advance two competing hypotheses that both
follow from the current literature on emotions. The first hypothesis is
that the intensity of a person’s regret following a poor decision is at-
tenuated when the decision was already doubted before the outcome
was known. This hypothesis is built upon our interpretation of subjective
expected pleasure theory (SEP; Mellers, et al., 1999), which extends de-
cision affect theory (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997) to include
regret in addition to disappointment and surprise. SEP integrates ideas
from regret and disappointment theories (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden,
1982) to predict the intensity of an emotional response to the outcome
of a decision. In SEP, emotional responses to outcomes depend upon (1)
the utility of the outcome, (2) how surprising the outcome is, and (3) a
disappointment and regret function. The regret function reflects the
difference in utility of the obtained outcome and the outcome that
could have been obtained had one chosen differently. Crucially for our
hypothesis, in the regret function, the “impact of regret depends on the
surprisingness of the joint outcome” (Mellers et al., 1999, p. 334). Thus
in SEP, unexpected outcomes following a poor decision generate more
regret than expected outcomes. In support of this account, research
consistently demonstrates that losses indeed evoke more intense emo-
tional reactions when the outcome came as a surprise. For example,
McGraw, Mellers and Tetlock (2005) found that Olympic athletes who
won silver yet who expected gold felt more disappointed than bronze
medalists. In a similar vein, studies by Huang and Zeelenberg (2012)
revealed that financial managers who made a poor investment experi-
enced more regret when the loss came as a surprise as opposed to when
the loss was expected (see also, Lin, Huang, & Zeelenberg, 2006). Fol-
lowing SEP, already doubting one’s decision is therefore predicted to
attenuate regret as it takes away the element of surprise when learning
that the outcome indeed could have been better. That is, when one
doubts whether one has made the correct decision or not, more thought
is given to the possible different outcomes, which should make these
outcomes less surprising. Hence, regret should be reduced when a
person already doubted one’s decision (as compared to a person who is
certain that she made the correct decision).
The second, competing, hypothesis about the effect of post-deci-
sional doubt on regret can be derived from decision justification theory
(DJT; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) and regret regulation theory (RRT;
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). These theories postulate that justifications
and feelings of self-blame affect the intensity of regret. Specifically, it
has repeatedly been shown that people experience more regret when
they feel responsible for having made a ‘wrong’ decision (e.g., Inman &
Zeelenberg, 2002; Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2005; Zeelenberg et al., 1998).
Already doubting one’s decision before knowing the outcome can be
seen as an indication that one may have made the wrong choice (as
compared to those who are certain that they made the right decision). It
seems likely that this goes hand in hand with blaming oneself for having
made a poor decision when learning the aversive outcome and, con-
sequently, more intense regret.
Taken together, based on the current literature, we can make two
opposing predictions about the effect of post-decisional doubt on the
experience of regret. Both predications are plausible, firmly based on
extant theorizing and consistent with published research findings.
Specifically, SEP leads us to expect attenuated regret when the decision
is already doubted in the post-decision but pre-outcome period. DJT
and RRT, on the other hand, leads us to predict the opposite, such that
regret would be amplified when a decision-maker already doubted
whether she has made the correct decision or not.
3. Overview of the present research
We conducted six studies to examine whether the relationship be-
tween post-decisional doubt and regret was more consistent with the
account provided by SEP or the ones provided by DJT/RRT. As initial
start, we ran a second pilot-study in which participants (N=101; 54
males, 47 females; Mage= 32.08, SD=10.81) were asked to describe a
personal experience in which they considered two choice options (A
and B), subsequently chose option A but realized over time that option
B would have been the better choice. After describing the choice si-
tuation in detail, participants were asked (1) whether they ever ques-
tioned their decision after reaching their decision (but before knowing
the outcome) and (2) whether they ever doubted their decision after
their decision (1=Never, I was certain I made the right decision,
5=Often). These two items were averaged into a ‘post-decisional
doubt’ composite measure (r= .80, p < .001; M=4.09, SD=0.88).
To assess regret, participants were asked the extent that they regretted
choosing option A over option B once realizing that B was the better
choice (1=Not at all, 5= Very much; M=4.01, SD=1.03).
Supporting decision justification theory and regret regulation theory,
more post-decisional doubt predicted more intense feelings of regret,
β= .47, t (99)= 5.30, p < .001.6
In what follows, we build upon these preliminary findings and ex-
tend them in several ways. Using a variety of different contexts and
methodologies (autobiographical recall studies, scenario studies and
4 To ascertain that our measure reflects two underlying factors, we ran a
factor analysis with Varimax rotation. The analysis yielded two factors ex-
plaining a total of 66.276% of the variance. Inspection of the rotated loading
patterns indicated that the items ‘I felt a strong urge to kick myself’, ‘It was very
clear I made a mistake’, ‘I kept blaming myself for the mistake I made’, and ‘I
often wished for a second chance’ uniquely loaded on the first factor (labeled
‘regret’) while 4 items uniquely loaded on the second factor (labeled ‘post-de-
cisional doubt’).
5 Note that these participants did not use the words doubt and regret inter-
changeably in their descriptions. They only mentioned regret in their writings
to inform us how they felt after learning the outcome of their decision.
6 To control for the importance of the decision, we also asked participants
how important this decision was to them (1=Not at all important, 5= Very
important; M=3.82, SD=1.05). Controlling for the importance of the decision
did not change the results in any meaningful way.
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several behavioral studies and experiments), we consistently find that
post-decisional doubts intensify regret. We also consistently find no re-
lationship between pre-decisional doubts and regret. Specifically, in
Study 1 and Study 2, we tested both the effects of pre-decisional and
post-decisional doubt on a person’s degree of experienced regret. Both
studies revealed that only post-decisional doubts increased the intensity
of regret while pre-decisional doubts were unrelated. In Study 3–5, we
tested the role of post-decisional doubt in actual choice dilemmas (as
opposed to remembered- and hypothetical situations). More specifi-
cally, in Study 3, participants played a trivia game in which they could
earn money for every correct answer they gave, while in Studies 4 and
5, participants’ earnings depended upon the choices they made in
various social interactions (i.e., a ‘trust game’ in Study 4 and a ‘social
prediction game’ in Study 5). Importantly, in all studies, some partici-
pants made decisions they later regretted. Here we replicated the
findings of the previous studies: participants who doubted their deci-
sion in the post-decisional phase experienced more intense regret when
learning the negative outcome than those who were certain they made
the correct decision. Finally, in Study 6, we tested the strength of the
relationship between post-decisional doubt and regret by replicating its
influence in one of the most robust findings in the domain of regret; the
action effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Reversing the classic action
effect, we found that those who started doubting their inaction ex-
perienced more regret than those who never doubted their decision to
act for a minute. In all studies, we predetermined the sample size, re-
port all dependent measures and experimental conditions, and exclude
no participants unless stated otherwise. All study materials and datasets
can be retrieved from the Open Science Framework7 and we encourage
readers to consult these for a full understanding of the results.
4. Studies 1 and 2: Two types of doubt and the experience of regret
The second pilot study in the introduction demonstrated that doubts
arising after a decision are associated with the intensity of a person’s
regret. In Studies 1 and 2, we extend these findings by testing how
regret is affected by doubts that frequently arise before reaching a de-
cision. Specifically, people often feel conflicted which option to choose
before choosing one of the choice alternatives. How are these pre-de-
cisional doubts related to post-decisional doubts? Importantly, how are
both types of doubts related in producing regret? We address these
questions in the following two studies.
4.1. Study 1: Autobiographical recall
The procedure of this study was similar to the procedure of our
second pilot study in the introduction. One hundred and thirteen
workers on MTurk (47 females, 66 males, Mage=33.68, SD=9.06)
were asked to describe a personal choice situation in which they
considered two choice options (A and B), they chose option A but
realized over time that option B would have been the better choice.
After describing the situation in detail, participants were asked a set of
questions. To assess pre-decisional doubt, participants indicated (1) the
extent that they doubted between both options before reaching their
decision and (2) the extent that they felt indecisive before reaching
their decision (1=Not at all, 5= Very much). These two items were
averaged into a ‘pre-decisional’ doubt composite measure (r= .64,
p < .001; M=3.30, SD=0.99). To assess post-decisional doubt, parti-
cipants indicated (1) whether they ever questioned their decision after
choosing option A and (2) whether they ever doubted their decision
after choosing option A (1=Never, I was certain I made the right decision,
5=Often). These two items were averaged into a ‘post-decisional’
doubt composite measure (r= .85, p < .001; M=4.13, SD=0.96).8
To assess regret, participants indicated the extent they regretted
choosing option A over option B once realizing that B was the better
choice (1=Never, 5= Very much; M=4.22, SD=0.94). Finally, par-
ticipants indicated how important this decision was to them (1=Not at
all important, 5= Very important; M=3.75, SD=1.13).
4.1.1. Results
First, people indicated experiencing significantly more doubt after a
decision than before making a choice (M=4.13, SD=0.96 vs.
M=3.30, SD=0.99), paired t=7.10, p < .001. In addition, both
types of doubt were significantly (yet not strongly) correlated, r= .18,
p= .05. More doubt before a decision was thus associated with more
doubt after one’s decision.
Next, in estimating the intensity of a person’s regret, we ran a
regression analyses with pre-decisional doubt, post-decisional doubt,
and importance as predictors in the model. The results indicated that
regret was significantly predicted by (1) the importance of the de-
cision and (2) a person’s degree of post-decisional doubt.
Specifically, important decisions were regretted more than less im-
portant decisions, β= .23, t=2.22, p= .009, and replicating the
finding of our second pilot study, more doubt after one’s decision
resulted in more intense feelings of regret, β= .30, t=3.38,
p < .001. The degree of doubt before reaching a decision did not
have a significant effect on the intensity of a person’s regret, β = .14,
t=1.60, p= .11. To gain more insights into the relationship be-
tween the two types of doubt and regret, we manipulated both types
in Study 2, rather than measuring them as in Study 1.
Table 1
Mean experiential content ratings for the post-decisional doubt and regret conditions (N=201).
Item Doubt experience Regret experience F (1, 199) p
I kept wondering whether I made the right decision 5.92 (2.05) > 4.43 (2.05) 36.32 .001
I felt a strong urge to kick myself 3.94 (2.12) < 4.90 (1.90) 11.44 .001
Not knowing for sure felt unsettling 5.16 (1.58) > 3.88 (1.98) 25.70 .001
It was very clear I made a mistake 4.12 (1.98) < 5.34 (1.76) 21.39 .001
Although I couldn’t articulate what it was, something just didn’t feel right 4.55 (1.65) = 4.27 (2.07) 1.17 .27
I kept blaming myself for the mistake I made 3.98 (1.94) < 5.08 (1.87) 16.77 .001
The uncertainty drove me crazy 4.17 (1.98) > 3.52 (1.99) 5.37 .02
I often wished for a second chance 4.38 (1.91) < 5.41 (1.72) 16.24 .001
Note: Entries are mean responses and standard deviations. Participants were asked to indicate the extent that each statement was accurate in describing their
respective experience on 7-point scales, with endpoints labeled Not at all accurate (1) and Very accurate (7).
7 https://osf.io/ntcy4/.
8 To verify that our measure reflects two underlying factors (i.e., pre-deci-
sional and post-decisional doubt respectively), we ran a factor analysis with
Varimax rotation. The analysis yielded two factors explaining a total of 87.24%
of the variance. Inspection of the rotated loading patterns indicated that the
items intended to measure post-decisional doubt uniquely loaded on the first
factor while the items intended to measure pre-decisional doubt uniquely
loaded on the second factor.
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4.2. Study 2: Experimental manipulation of pre- and post-decisional doubt
Four hundred and three online participants (159 females, 244
males,Mage=33.89, SD=9.86) were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions based on a 2 (Doubt before the decision: Yes vs. No)× 2
(Doubt after the decision: Yes vs. No) between-subjects design.
Participants read a scenario in which they had to decide which of two
hotels to book. The different manipulations of doubt before the decision
are in [brackets] and the different manipulations of the degree of doubt
after the decision are in {braces}.
You planned a business trip to India and had to decide which hotel
to book. There were two hotels that you took into consideration: The
New Delhi hotel and The Bombay hotel. [You decided, without any
hesitation, to book a room at The New Delhi/You doubted what to
do but eventually decided to book a room at The New Delhi]. {and
you have never questioned your decision for a minute ever since/yet
you started doubting whether you made the right decision after-
wards}. Today, you learn that The New Delhi is not that great while
The Bombay is quite comfortable.
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate how
much regret they would feel about deciding to book a room at The New
Delhi (1=Not at all, 7= Very much).
4.2.1. Results
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2.
Replicating the findings of Study 1, the results only showed a sig-
nificant main effect for ‘post-decisional doubt’ on regret ratings, F (1,
399) = 10.33, p= .001, η2 = .03, while no effect of pre-decisional
doubt was found, F (1, 399) = 3.18, p= .08, η2 = .008, neither a
significant interaction, F (1, 399)= 1.39, p= .24, η2 = .003. Parti-
cipants thus indicated that they would experience most regret when
they started doubting their decision, irrespective of the degree of
doubt that they experienced before choosing one of the choice op-
tions. Overall, the results of our first two studies indicate that post-
decisional doubt intensifies the experience of regret while pre-deci-
sional doubts are unrelated. Because pre-decisional doubts do not
appear to influence the intensity of a person’s regret, we only focus
on the role of post-decisional doubt in our next studies. Specifically,
in Study 3–5, we tested the role of post-decisional doubt in actual
choice dilemmas (as opposed to remembered- and hypothetical si-
tuations).
5. Study 3: Post-decisional doubt in an incentivized trivia game
The current study provides three extensions. First, we test how
post-decisional doubt affects regret in an actual choice dilemma (i.e.,
participants played a trivia game in which they could earn money),
allowing us to assess a participant’s degree of post-decisional doubt at
exactly the right moment (i.e., directly after a decision yet before the
outcome is known). Second, because participants can answer trivia
questions incorrectly and correctly, we asses regret in the first place,
and relief in the second. Relief is the emotion that people experience
when realizing that their current situation could have been worse if
they had decided differently (Zeelenberg, 2009). Although not our
primary interest, we explore in detail whether and how relief is related
to post-decisional doubts. Finally, while regret is typically experienced
after knowing the outcome of a decision, recent research by Kirkebøen
and Teigen (2011) indicates that it is also possible to experience regret
before the outcome is revealed (i.e., during the same phase as to when
the experience of post-decisional occurs). Kirkebøen and Teigen refer
to this as pre-outcome regret. For example, in one of their studies,
participants imagined agreeing to give a speech at a future wedding
and were asked how much they would regret this decision (before
giving the actual speech). The results showed that this decision would
already be regretted, even though the outcome of the public perfor-
mance was still unknown. Given that pre-outcome regret and post-
decisional doubt can co-occur in the same decisional phase, it is
possible that instead of post-decisional doubt, we are merely picking
up on the effects caused by pre-outcome regret. This is why, in the
current study, we assessed a person’s degree of (1) pre-outcome regret
and (2) post-decisional doubt after one’s decision (but before knowing
the outcome). This allows us a very conservative test: does post-de-
cisional doubt increases a person’s degree of regret after learning the
outcome above and beyond any feelings of pre-outcome regret? Note
that this study’s pre-registration can be found at https://aspredicted.
org/pv6mn.pdf.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants and procedure
Four hundred and four participants on MTurk played a fully in-
centivized, general knowledge quiz. Prior to analyses (and following
the pre-registration plan), we discarded the response of one partici-
pant for failing an attention check. In addition, the data of fourteen
participants were missing due to the imposed time restriction when
answering the general knowledge question (see below for more de-
tails), leaving us with a final sample of 389 participants (183 fe-
males, 206 males, Mage=37.00, SD=11.04). All participants re-
ceived $0.25 as fixed fee with the potential to earn an extra bonus
payment (dependent on their answer in the quiz). Specifically, par-
ticipants learned that they would be asked a general knowledge
question and that they could earn $0.25 extra when their answer was
correct. After reading the instructions, participants were redirected
to the trivia question (i.e., what is the capital city of Brazil? São
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, or Brasília?). To ensure that participants
would not look up the correct answer, they were instructed to answer
the question within 15 s (or lose the opportunity to answer the
question) and we programmed the study as such that it would auto-
advance after a certain time frame.
5.1.2. Measurements
After answering the question (but before informing a participant
whether it was correct or not), we assessed this person’s degree of (1)
pre-outcome regret and (2) post-decisional doubt. To measure these two
factors, participants were presented with four statements (in random
order) and were asked how accurate each statement was in describing
how they felt about their answer (1=Not at all accurate; 5= Very ac-
curate). We used the first four statement from pilot study 1 (see Table 1)
to measure these constructs as these items capture the important ex-
periential distinction between both experiences. That is, while doubt is
characterized by feeling uncertain about the correctness of one’s deci-
sion, regret is defined by knowing for certain that one has made a
mistake (a belief that can already present itself before knowing the
actual outcome in the case of pre-outcome regret; see Kirkebøen &
Teigen, 2011). As such, to measure pre-outcome regret, participants
responded to the statements: “At this moment, I feel a strong urge to
kick myself for the clear mistake I made” and “At this moment, it is
Table 2




Yes 5.39 (1.19) 4.80 (1.53) 5.10 (1.38)
No 5.47 (1.16) 5.20 (1.51) 5.33 (1.37)
5.43 (1.17) 5.00 (1.53)
Note: Entries are mean regret ratings (standard deviations in parentheses), as-
sessed on a 7-point scale, with higher scores indicating more intense regret.
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already very clear to me that I made a mistake”, r= .77, p < .001.9 To
measure post-decisional doubt, participants responded to the state-
ments: “I am wondering if I made the correct decision” and “Not
knowing for sure if my answer is correct or not feels unsettling”,
r= .65, p < .001.
To ascertain that these items indeed measure pre-outcome regret
and post-decisional doubt (and not one underlying factor), we ran a
principal component analysis with Varimax rotation. The analysis
yielded two factors explaining a total of 86.087% of the variance (see
Table 3). Inspection of the rotated loading patterns showed that the
items intended to measure ‘pre-outcome regret’ loaded high on the first
factor and low on the second factor while the reverse was true for those
items intended to measure ‘post-decisional doubt’. These results in-
dicate that two underlying factors (as opposed to one general factor) are
reflected in our measurement instrument. As such, we created compo-
site scores for each factor by averaging the corresponding items into
composite measures.
After participants indicated their degree of pre-outcome regret and
post-decisional doubt, we redirected them to a new screen in which
they learned whether their answer was incorrect or correct. When in-
correct (correct), participants were asked to indicate how much they
regretted (felt relieved for) having answered the question with their
respective answer (1=Not at all, 5= Very much).
5.2. Results and discussion
In total, 262 participants answered the question incorrectly (127
answered correctly). We were interested in how the intensity of a
person’s regret and relief was related to the degree that they regretted
and doubted their answer before knowing the outcome of the quiz.
5.2.1. Regret
Table 4 (upper panel) reports the means, standard deviations, and
correlations of all study variables for participants who experienced
regret. In testing the roles of pre-outcome regret and post-decisional
doubt on regret, a two-stage hierarchical multiple regression analysis
was conducted. At stage 1, we conducted a multiple regression esti-
mating regret with gender, age, and pre-outcome regret. Critically, at
stage 2, post-decisional doubt was entered as predictor into the model
to test whether adding doubt would significantly explain more unique
variance.
The regression statistics for regret are presented in the upper panel
of Table 5. At stage 1, more regret before knowing the outcome (i.e.,
pre-outcome regret) was significantly related to more regret after
learning the outcome of one’s decision. We also found that gender was
related to regret (women evidently experienced more regret than men
when learning the aversive outcome). Importantly, at stage 2, including
post-decisional doubt significantly improved the model (ΔR2= .08;
p < .001). Replicating our previous findings, more doubt before
knowing the outcome produced significantly more regret after learning
the outcome. These findings are important for several reasons. First, we
replicate the effect of doubt on regret in a fully incentivized choice
dilemma in which doubt was assessed at exactly the right moment (i.e.,
after one’s decision, but before knowing the outcome). Second, this ef-
fect exists above and beyond any feelings of regret that a person may
already experience about one’s decision. That is, given that pre-
Table 3
Rotated factor loadings, Study 3 (N=389).
Loadings





At this moment, I feel a strong urge to kick
myself for the clear mistake I made
.919 .199
At this moment, it is very clear to me that I
made a mistake
.922 .174
I am wondering if I made the correct
decision
.082 .926
Not knowing for sure if my answer is
correct or not feels unsettling
.322 .843
Eigenvalue 2.418 1.026
% of total variance 60.45% 25.64%
Total variance 86.09%
Table 4
Means, standard deviations, and correlations, Study 3 (upper panel regret,
N=262; lower panel relief, N=127).
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
Age 36.91 10.88 1
Gender – – −.03 1
Pre-outcome regret 2.02 1.09 −.01 .06 1
Post-decisional doubt 3.37 1.14 .02 .26*** .28*** 1
Regret 3.74 1.41 .03 .17** .19** .34*** 1
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
Age 37.19 11.41 1
Gender – – .09 1
Pre-outcome regret 1.57 0.92 −.13 .09 1
Post-decisional doubt 2.48 1.34 −.11 .20* .58*** 1
Relief 3.69 1.28 −.11 .30** .34*** .55*** 1
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Table 5
Summary of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses for variables pre-
dicting regret and relief in a trivia game, Study 3 (total N=389).
Regret (N=262)
Stage 1 Stage 2
Variables b SE b β b SE b β
Age 0.01 0.01 .04 0.00 0.01 .03
Gender (0=Male, 1= Female) 0.44 0.17 .15* 0.23 0.17 .08
Pre-outcome regret 0.23 0.08 .17** 0.12 0.08 .09
Post-decisional doubt 0.36 0.07 .30***
R2 .05 .13
F for change in R2 5.23** 22.17***
Relief (N=127)
Stage 1 Stage 2
Variables b SE b β b SE b β
Age −0.01 0.01 −.10 −0.01 0.01 −0.07
Gender (0=Male, 1= Female) 0.75 0.22 .28** 0.55 0.20 .20**
Pre-outcome regret 0.42 0.11 .31*** 0.05 0.12 .04
Post-decisional doubt 0.46 0.09 .49***
R2 .20 .35
F for change in R2 10.11*** 28.37***
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
9 Please note that one reviewer felt that the statements assessing pre-outcome
regret were not entirely appropriate, since they seemed to imply the existence
of a mistake in addition to reporting feelings. Although we understand this
concern, we believe that these statements do reflect the experience of pre-
outcome regret correctly as they measure two defining features of regret: (i)
knowing for certain that one has made a mistake (a belief that can already
present itself before the actual outcome is revealed; see Kirkebøen & Teigen,
2011) and (ii) the urge to punish oneself as a result of one’s mistake (e.g.,
Zeelenberg et al., 1998).
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outcome regret and post-decisional doubt can co-occur, it could be
possible that we are merely picking up on the effect of pre-outcome
regret when testing our hypotheses. The results of the current study
exclude this possibility and provide strong support for the unique im-
pact of post-decisional doubt on the experience of regret.10
5.2.2. Relief
Although our main interest is in the effect of doubt on regret, we
also explored whether post-decisional doubt would impact the intensity
of a person’s relief. Table 4 (lower panel) reports the means, standard
deviations, and correlations of all study variables for participants who
experienced relief. In testing this relationship, we again conducted a
two-stage hierarchical multiple regression analysis. At stage 1, we ran a
multiple regression estimating relief with a person’s gender, age, and
pre-outcome regret. At stage 2, post-decisional doubt was entered as
predictor into the model.
The regression statistics for relief are presented in the lower panel of
Table 5. At stage 1, more regret before knowing the outcome (i.e., pre-
outcome regret) was significantly associated with more relief after
learning the outcome. We also found that gender was related to relief as
women evidently experienced more relief than men. Importantly, at
stage 2, including post-decisional doubt significantly improved the
model (ΔR2= .15; p < .001). Similar to the effect on regret, doubting
one’s decision before knowing the outcome produced more relief after
learning that one’s decision was correct. Overall, these findings support
and extend the finding that post-decisional doubt increases the intensity
of a person’s emotional reaction to outcomes. In our next study, we
tested the role of post-decisional doubt in a very different choice con-
text; the decision to trust others or not.
6. Study 4: Post-decisional doubt in an incentivized trust game
In our next study, the effect of post-decisional doubt on regret was
tested in a fully incentivized social choice dilemma; the trust game. The
trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Dasgupta, 1988) is a
common experimental paradigm for studying mutual trust in two-
person interactions. The trust game, as depicted in Fig. 1, is an anon-
ymous one-shot interaction in which people in the role of Player 1 (the
trustor) have to decide between two possible actions: if Player 1 does
not trust Player 2 (and moves OUT), the game ends, leaving both parties
with moderate rewards. If Player 1 does trust (and moves IN), Player 2
has to choose between two possible options: honoring trust by moving
left, leaving both persons better off than when Player 1 did not trust, or
betraying trust (by moving right), which maximizes personal gain for
Player 2 at the expense of Player 1.
As a trustor in the trust game, there are thus two regret evoking
choices. First, trusting a trustee who turns out to be untrustworthy (i.e.,
choosing IN while Player 2 chooses RIGHT). Second, not trusting a
trustworthy person (i.e., choosing OUT while Player 2 chooses LEFT).
These choices are regret evoking as they yield outcomes that could have
been better had Player 1 chosen differently (see also, Martinez &
Zeelenberg, 2015). In the current study, we were interested in how
much regret players would feel in both situations and how this is re-
lated to the degree that they already doubted their decision prior to
knowing the decision of the trustee.
6.1. Method
Three hundred and six participants on MTurk played a fully in-
centivized, anonymous trust game in the role of Player 1 (trustor) or
Player 2 (trustee). All participants received $0.30 as show-up fee and
earned an extra bonus (dependent on the choices that both players
made during the game).
Using a chart as in Fig. 1, participants received instructions re-
garding the rules of the anonymous two-person interaction. There were
two stages. First, 153 participants in the role of Player 1 chose to trust
or not trust player 2. These are the participants that are included in the
analysis (65 females, 88 males, Mage=34.08, SD=10.26). In addition,
there were also 153 participants in the role of Player 2 who chose to
honor trust or not. The responses of these participants were collected to
create a real trust game for participants in the role of Player 1, but will
not be analyzed as we did not measure any emotional reactions of these
players. We only collected their decisions (honor trust vs. betray trust)
so we could randomly couple them to Player 1 and inform Player 1
about the decision of their respective partner.
This procedure resulted in two regret situations for participant in
the role of Player 1: 42 couples in which Player 1 chose to trust while
Player 2 chose to betray trust, and 43 couples in which Player 1 chose
not to trust, but found out that Player 2 would have honored the
trust. There were also two relief situations for participants in the role
of Player 1: 35 couples in which Player 1 chose to trust and Player 2
honored the trust, and 33 couples in which Player 1 chose not to trust
and found out that Player 2 indeed would have betrayed one’s trust.
We assessed Player 1’s emotional reaction to Player 2’s decision and




After Player 1’s decision to trust or not (but before knowing the
decision of Player 2), we assessed this person’s degree of post-deci-
sional doubt. Specifically, participants in the role of Player 1 in-
dicated (1) how confident they were that their decision to go IN or
OUT (depending on their decision) was the best decision, (2) how
certain they were that their decision to go IN or OUT was the best
decision, and (3) the extent they doubted whether their decision to
either go IN or OUT was the best decision (1= Not at all, 5 = Very
much). The first two items were reversed coded and the three items
were subsequently averaged into a ‘post-decisional doubt’ composite
measurement (α= .88). Next, participants were redirected to a new
screen in which they were informed about the decision of their
partner (Player 2).
Fig. 1. Simple trust game as used in Study 4.
10 In Appendix A, we present the results of a (preregistered) exploratory
analysis, testing whether the effect of post-decisional doubt on regret is dif-
ferent for participants whose answer was a complete random guess (versus a
more informed decision). Interestingly, the results indicated that randomly
choosing a choice alternative induced doubt, yet this did not feed into the ex-
perience of regret when learning the poor outcome. These results suggest that
doubt originating from different sources impacts the intensity of regret differ-
ently.
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6.2.2. Regret and blame
All participants who made a ‘wrong’ decision (i.e., those who
decided to trust an untrustworthy party and those who decided not to
trust a trustworthy party) were asked to indicate, (1) the degree that
they blamed themselves for having made a poor decision, and (2) the
degree that they regretted their decision (1=Not at all, 5= Very
much).
6.2.3. Relief and praise
All participants who made a ‘correct’ decision (i.e., those who
decided to trust a trustworthy party and those who decided not to trust
an untrustworthy party) were asked to indicate, (1) the degree that they
praised themselves for having made a good decision, and (2) the degree




Table 6 (upper panel) reports the means, standard deviations, and
correlations of all study variables for participants who made a wrong
decision. In testing the role of post-decisional doubt on the experience
of regret, a two-stage hierarchical multiple regression analysis was
conducted. At stage 1, we conducted a multiple regression estimating
regret with Player 1’s age, gender, decision (0= trust and 1= not
trust) and degree of post-decisional doubt as predictors. At stage 2, the
interaction of decision and post-decisional doubt was entered as pre-
dictor in the model.
The regression statistics for regret are presented in the upper-left
panel of Table 7. The results showed that players who chose to trust
(and got betrayed) experienced significantly more regret than those
who chose not to trust a trustworthy party. This finding is consistent
with the notion that ‘trust betrayal’ is one of the most painful social
experiences (Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2008). Im-
portantly, replicating our previous findings (now in a social dilemma),
more post-decisional doubt after one’s decision was again associated
with more intense levels of regret when learning the aversive decision
outcome.
Interestingly, in the second stage, we observed that the relationship
between post-decisional doubt and regret was moderated by the deci-
sion of a player (trust vs. not trust). Specifically, although post-deci-
sional doubt predicted more intense regret for those players who chose
not to trust a trustworthy partner, b=0.94, SE=0.19, p < .001, this
relationship was absent for players who chose to trust and got betrayed,
b=0.23, SE=0.24, p= .33. As can be seen in Fig. 2, players who
chose to trust (and got betrayed) regretted their choice irrespective of
whether they doubted their decision prior to knowing the outcome of
the social interaction. However, for those who chose not to trust a
trustworthy partner, more post-decisional doubt was again associated
with more intense regret.
6.3.2. Self-blame
To estimate levels of self-blame, we again conducted a two-stage
hierarchical multiple regression analysis with age, gender, decision
type and post-decisional doubt as predictors in stage 1. The regression
statistics for self-blame are presented in the upper-right panel of
Table 7. In stage 1, we did not find an effect of decision type (0= trust
and 1= not trust) on perceptions of self-blame. Players who chose to
trust an untrustworthy partner thus experienced similar degrees of
blame than those who chose not to trust a trustworthy partner. We did
find that post-decisional doubt was significantly related to perceptions
of self-blame. Players who started doubting their decision were thus
significantly more likely to blame themselves for having made a poor
decision. In stage 2, we included the interaction of a person’s decision
and post-decisional doubt but we did not observe a significant inter-
action effect.
6.3.3. Relief and praise
Table 6 (lower panel) reports the means, standard deviations, and
correlations of all study variables for participants who made a correct
decision. We explored whether we again would find that post-decisional
doubt influences feelings of relief, but we did not find any significant
relationships in this study (see lower-left panel of Table 7). In a similar
vein, we did not find any significant relationship between post-deci-
sional doubts and feelings of praise (lower-right panel). The exact
reason why we find mixed results for the role of post-decisional doubt
in the experience of relief is unclear. In Study 3, where we examined
choices in a trivia quiz, post-decisional doubt and relief were related,
but in the present situations it seems like the relief that our participants
experienced only reflected the valence of the outcome. Because in trust
games, the outcomes always depend on the choices of the other player,
individual considerations of doubt might not be that important when
realizing that one has made the correct decision. To gain more insights
into the relationship between post-decisional doubt and regret in actual
choice dilemmas, we manipulated doubt in Study 5, rather than mea-
suring it as in Studies 3 and 4.
7. Study 5: Manipulating post-decisional doubt in an incentivized
choice dilemma
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants and procedure
Three hundred and one participants on MTurk (127 females, 174
males, Mage=35.93, SD=10.47) played a ‘color game’ in which par-
ticipants were asked to predict the favorite color of another participant
who participated earlier in the study. More specifically, participants
were told that they were randomly coupled with a male participant
named John (in reality a fictional player) who was asked to indicate
which color he favors more, blue or yellow. It was the participant’s task
to predict the color that the other player picked. If the prediction was
correct, the participant would receive $0.20 as bonus payment, while
John would receive nothing. However, when incorrect, the participant
would receive nothing, while John would receive the extra bonus
payment.
To manipulate doubt in one’s prediction, participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. In the first
condition (the ‘naïve player’ condition), participants were told that the
other player was not informed about the specific rules concerning the
bonus payments. John was thus simply asked to indicate his favorite
color (blue or yellow). In the second condition (the ‘strategic player’
condition), participants were told that the other player was explicitly
Table 6
Means, standard deviations, and correlations, Study 4 (upper panel regret,
N=85; lower panel relief, N=68).
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
Age 34.25 10.30 1
Gender – – −.01 1
Decision – – −.08 −.20 1
Post-doubt 2.57 1.06 −.03 .11 −.19 1
Self-blame 2.80 1.70 .03 .06 −.23* .29** 1
Regret 2.95 1.70 .02 .08 −.40*** .39*** .82*** 1
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
Age 33.88 10.30 1
Gender – – .19 1
Decision – – .02 −.06 1
Post-doubt 2.37 1.00 −.12 −.12 −.33** 1
Self-praise 3.84 1.17 −.12 −.11 .01 .01 1
Relief 4.37 1.05 −.07 .01 −.15 .07 .60*** 1
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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informed about the rules concerning the bonus payments. When picking
a color, John was thus motivated to strategically choose a color that the
other player would predict incorrectly. We expected that participants in
this condition would therefore experience significantly more doubts
about one’s prediction (as compared to the first experimental condition
in which John was simply asked to pick his favorite color). In a similar
vein, given the expected difference in post-decisional doubt as a func-
tion of our experimental manipulation, we also expected more regret in
the second condition when a participant learned that one’s choice was
incorrect.
After reading the instructions, participants answered three com-
prehension checks. Given the simplicity of the ‘color game’, a large
majority (90% or 271 out of 301 participants) answered all compre-
hension checks correctly. We report the results of all participants below
(including those who failed the comprehension checks). Removing
these participants did not yield any meaningful differences in the re-
sults.11
7.1.2. Measurements
After reading the instructions, participants were first asked to pre-
dict the color that John chose, blue or yellow. Next, after predicting
John’s color (yet before informing a participant whether it was correct
or not), we assessed a participant’s degree of doubt in one’s prediction.
Specifically, participants indicated the degree that they experienced
any doubts about their decision (1=Not at all, 9= Very much).
After indicating the degree of doubt in their respective prediction,
participants were redirected to a new screen in which they learned
whether their decision was correct or not. We programmed the ex-
periment as such that a participant’s prediction was always incorrect.
Thus, when a participant’s prediction was blue, we told that the other
player picked yellow and vice versa. After learning that their prediction
was incorrect, participants were asked to indicate the extent that they
regretted their decision (1=Not at all, 9= Very much).
7.2. Results
7.2.1. Manipulation check
The manipulation of post-decisional doubt was successful.
Participants experienced significantly more post-decisional doubt
(M=5.73, SD=2.27) when playing with a ‘strategic’ player as com-
pared to playing with a player who simply indicated his favorite color
(M=5.07, SD=2.05), t (299)= 2.61, p= .01. We also found a sig-
nificant difference in the predictions that participants made. In the
condition in which John was simply asked to pick a color, a large
majority (89%, or 132/148 participants) thought he picked blue. But,
when playing with the strategic player, only a small majority (55%, or
Table 7
Summary of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses for variables predicting regret, blame, relief, and self-praise, Study 4.
Regret Self-Blame
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Variables b SE b β b SE b β b SE b β b SE b β
Age 0.00 0.02 −.01 −0.01 0.02 −.04 0.00 0.02 .02 0.00 0.02 .07
Gender −0.06 0.34 −.02 −0.13 0.33 −.04 −0.02 0.37 −.01 −0.10 0.37 −.02
Decision (0=Trust, 1=Not trust) −1.14 0.34 −.34*** −3.04 0.89 −.90*** −0.60 0.37 −.18 −1.73 1.00 −.51
Post-decisional doubt 0.52 0.16 .33** 0.22 0.20 .14 0.41 0.18 .26* 0.23 0.23 .15
Decision×post-decisional doubt 0.74 0.32 .59* 0.44 0.36 .35
R2 .26 .31 .12 .13
F for change in R2 6.87*** 5.25* 2.56* 1.47
Relief Self-Praise
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Variables b SE b β b SE b β b SE b β b SE b β
Age −0.01 0.01 −.12 −0.01 0.01 −.12 −0.02 0.01 −.15 −0.02 0.01 −.16
Gender −0.03 0.25 −.02 −0.01 0.26 −.01 −0.27 0.29 −.12 −0.22 0.29 −.10
Decision (0=Trust, 1=Not trust) −0.18 0.26 −.10 0.04 0.68 .02 0.11 0.29 .05 0.77 0.77 .35
Post-decisional doubt 0.02 0.13 .03 0.06 0.17 .07 0.00 0.15 .00 0.12 0.20 .10
Decision×post-decisional doubt −0.10 0.27 −.12 −0.29 0.31 −.31
R2 .03 .03 .05 .06
F for change in R2 0.43 0.13 0.75 0.89
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Fig. 2. Regret (mean) as a function of post-decisional doubt and decision type
(IN=Trust vs. OUT=Not trust), Study 4.
11 A significant main effect between conditions on the intensity of regret, F
(1, 267)=4.45, p= .04, η2= .02.
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84/153 participants) predicted he picked blue, χ2 (1,
N=301)=43.64, p < .001, φ= .38. In order to rule out that the
expected difference in regret between conditions is due to the observed
difference in predictions (and not due to the change in post-decisional
doubt between conditions), we controlled for this in further analyses.
7.2.2. Regret
An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect between conditions on
the intensity of regret, F (1, 297)= 5.64, p= .02, η2= .02. As pre-
dicted, participants in the ‘strategic player’ condition experienced more
regret (M=6.26, SD=2.85) than those who were partnered with a
player who was simply asked to pick a color (M=5.75, SD=2.82). We
did not find a main effect on the different types of predictions that
people made (blue vs. yellow), F (1, 297)= 1.63, p= .20, ƞ2= .005,
neither a significant interaction, F (1, 297)= 3.08, p= .08, η2= .01.
Overall, this study, in which we manipulated a person’s degree of post-
decisional doubt, again supported the conjecture that this type of doubt
increases the intensity of regret when realizing that the outcome could
have been better when chosen differently. In our final study, we ex-
amined the role of post-decisional doubt in one of the most replicated
findings in the domain of regret: the action effect.
8. Study 6: Post-decisional doubt and the action effect
The action effect refers to the observation that outcomes through
action produce more regret than identical outcomes achieved through
inaction. In the first study documenting this effect, Kahneman and
Tversky (1982; p. 173) asked participants to read a scenario describing
two stockowners. One of these, Paul, owned shares in company A,
considered switching to stock in company B, but decided against it.
Then, after a while Paul found out that he would have earned $1200 if
he had switched. The other stockowner, George, owned shares in
company B and switched to stock in company A. After a while he rea-
lized that he would have earned $1200 if he had decided not switch.
Participants were then asked who they thought would experience more
regret, Paul (who lost out on $1200 by not switching) or George (who
lost out on $1200 by switching)? Although both Paul and George suf-
fered the same financial loss, a large majority of participants believed
that George (who switched) regretted his choice more than Paul (who
did not switch). Importantly, this effect has been observed in a variety
of choice situations (e.g., Landman, 1987; Zeelenberg, Van den Bos,
Van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002) and has even been labeled “the clearest and
most frequently replicated finding” in the domain of regret (Gilovich &
Medvec, 1995, p. 380). Would the effect of post-decisional doubt also
emerge in this situation? In three different scenarios we examined
whether the action effect reverses when actions are followed with
confidence while inactions with considerable levels of doubt. For
brevity only the first scenario is described fully. Complete descriptions
of the other two scenarios are provided in Appendix B.
8.1. Method
All three scenarios described a situation of two persons who suffered
an identical loss either through action or inaction. Participants were
subsequently asked who they thought would experience more regret. In
the first scenario, participants read the earlier described Kahneman and
Tversky scenario and were randomly assigned to one of three condi-
tions; control, doubt-action, or doubt-inaction. Participants in the control
condition read the original investor scenario in which Paul decided not
to switch while George decided to switch and both end up losing $1200.
In the doubt-action condition participants read an adjusted version of
the original scenario in which we mentioned that Paul (who did not
switch) never doubted his decision for a minute while George (who
switched) started doubting his decision. Finally, in the doubt-inaction
condition, participants read that Paul (who did not switch) started to
doubt his decision while George (who switched) never doubted his
decision for a minute. The exact scenario in the doubt-inaction condi-
tion read as follows:
Paul owns shares in company A. During the past year he considered
switching to stock in company B. Paul decided against it yet he
started questioning whether he made the right decision. Today he
finds out that he would have been better off by $1200 if he had
switched to the stock of company B. George owned shares in com-
pany B. During the past year he considered switching to stock in
company A. George decided to switch and never questioned his
decision for a minute. Today he finds out that he would have been
better off by $1,200 if he had kept his stock in company B.
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate who
experienced more regret. The other two scenarios shared the same basic
structure and dependent variable (see Appendix B). Participants in all
scenario were recruited using MTurk (Scenario 1N=149, 59 females,
90 males,Mage=32.56, SD=10.10; Scenario 2N=155, 7 females, 93
males, 5 missing, Mage=33.79, SD=10.79; Scenario 3N=150, 58
females, 87 males, 5 missing, Mage=31.11, SD=9.59).
8.2. Results and discussion




































Paul (inaction) George (action)
Fig. 3. Proportion of participants indicating who regretted the decision more in
the three different conditions of the three scenarios, Study 6.
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In order to analyze the data, we collapsed the data of all three scenarios
as we did not find any significant differences across the patterns of the
three different scenarios. Replicating the action effect, participants in
the control conditions attributed more regret to the person who decided
to act (113 out of 145 or 78%) as compared to the person who decided
not to act (32 out of 145 or 22%). The same pattern of results was found
in the action-doubt conditions: the majority believed that actions fol-
lowed by doubt would produce most regret (129 out of 154 or 84%).
This pattern did not statistically differ from the control conditions, χ2
(1, N=299)= 1.65, p= .19, φ= .08. Importantly, in the inaction-
doubt conditions (in which the person who decided not to act started
doubting his decision), the pattern reversed. In these conditions, people
attributed most regret to the person who decided not to act (106 out of
155 or 68%). The difference between these conditions and the control
conditions was statistically significant, χ2 (1, N=300)=64.70,
p < .001, φ= .46. In addition, comparing the inaction-doubt condi-
tions with the action-doubt conditions also rendered a statistically
significant difference, χ2 (1, N=309)= 86.04, p < .001, φ= .52.
The results of three different studies consistently reversed one of the
most robust findings in the domain of regret; the action effect. Overall,
these findings support the hypothesis that post-decisional doubt in-
creases the intensity of a person’s regret when realizing that the out-
come could have been better.
9. General discussion
Decisions often produce considerable levels of doubt and regret, yet
little is known about how these experiences are related. In six studies,
we consistently find that doubts arising after a decision (i.e., when
people question whether they made the right choice) increase the in-
tensity of regret. We find mixed results for the effect of post-decisional
doubt on the experience of relief and no support for a relationship
between pre-decisional doubts and regret. Let us elaborate on this later
finding, before discussing the theoretical- and practical implications of
the current research.
This latter finding, that pre-decisional doubt is unrelated to re-
gret, is surprising as those who chose the wrong option after an in-
stance of doubt were closer in choosing the right option than those
who chose the wrong option without any hesitation. Following norm
theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), this difference in closeness
should have influenced regret differently. More specifically, a key
proposition of norm theory is that people’s emotional responses to
events are influenced by the perceived closeness in attaining the
outcome that did not materialize. For example, imagine two lottery
players who did not win this month’s jackpot (the winning ticket
number was AB122). The first player’s ticket number was ZK695
while the second player’s number was AB123. Who is more upset?
Although both players did not win the jackpot, these players differ in
the ease with which they can imagine themselves winning a fortune.
This is easier for the second player as he was only one number away
from a lifetime of wealth. This example demonstrates the principle of
‘closeness’: the closer a person was in attaining the outcome that did
not materialize, the stronger one’s emotional response to the out-
come that did materialize. Given that those who doubted between
options (but eventually chose the wrong option) were closer in
choosing the right option than those who chose the wrong option
without any hesitation, norm theory would have predicted more
regret for these individuals. Nonetheless, this is not what we find and
several reasons may account for this (null) finding. First, some
people may equate pre-decisional doubt with decision carefulness, a
factor shown to attenuate the intensity of regret. For example, Reb
and Connolly (2010) recently found that individuals who carefully
reached their decision (by searching for additional information
concerning the options under consideration) experienced less regret
than those who decided carelessly. When some people equate pre-
decisional doubt with decision carefulness, this might have mitigated
the overall effect of pre-decisional doubt on regret. Second, although
people may be conflicted which option to choose in the pre-deci-
sional phase, full-blown doubt is typically experienced after having
committed to one of the choice options. This reasoning follows from
the proposition that doubt needs a preexisting decision (or belief) as
reference point that is targeted when conflicting arguments become
available that challenge the correctness of the decision. Given that no
option has been selected yet in the pre-decisional phase (acting as
reference point), doubt may therefore be generally mild in this phase
(losing its predictive strength when the outcome is revealed). The
results of our first study support this conjecture as decision makers
indeed indicated that they experienced much less doubts before a
decision (as opposed to after a decision).
Although no prior work has examined how doubt affects people’s
reactions to decision outcomes, recent research in other domains (social
judgment and persuasion respectively) has given an increasing amount
of attention to a related construct, attitude certainty (Abelson, 1988;
Brandt, Evans, & Crawford, 2014; Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995;
Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007; Tormala & Petty, 2002). Attitude
certainty refers to the subjective belief that an attitude or opinion is
correct and research has documented a variety of antecedents and
consequences of this construct. For example, research has repeatedly
demonstrated that a person’s attitude certainty is increased when
learning that others hold similar attitudes (e.g., Festinger, 1954, Visser
& Mirabile, 2004), or after repeatedly expressing the attitude to oneself
or others (e.g., Holland, Verplanken, & Knippenberg, 2003; Petrocelli
et al., 2007). In terms of consequences, attitude certainty has been
shown to result in more persistence and resistance when information
becomes available that undermines the validity of the attitude (e.g.,
Petrocelli et al., 2007; Tormala & Petty, 2002). Although attitude cer-
tainty is primarily investigated in different domains, its insights are of
great importance for understanding the workings of post-decisional
doubt. For example, following the observed relationship between social
support and attitude certainty, we would expect that decision-makers
who learn that others made similar decisions experience less post-de-
cisional doubt than those who learn that others favored an alternative
course of action. In a similar vein, decision-makers who are certain that
they made the correct decision are, in turn, hypothesized to be less
likely to reverse their decision (i.e., more persistent) when information
becomes available that suggests that the alternative option might be the
better choice.
9.1. Theoretical implications
This research project started with the realization that, based on
current theories of regret, diametrically opposite effects of post-de-
cisional doubt on regret could be predicted. The finding that post-
decisional doubt increases the intensity of regret is inconsistent with
the conjecture that this type of doubt may already prepare people for
the worst. Specifically, subjective expected pleasure theory (Mellers
et al., 1999) argues that emotional reactions are less intense when
outcomes are expected as opposed to unexpected. As a consequence,
this account would have predicted less intense feelings of regret for
those individuals who already questioned whether they made the
correct decision (and for whom the aversive outcome thus did not
come as a complete surprise). Instead, the results of our studies
support the hypothesis based on decision justification theory
(Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) and regret regulation theory
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Those who already doubted their de-
cision felt more responsible for having made a poor choice and,
consequently, experienced more regret (as compared to those who
were certain that they made the correct decision). In what follows,
we will discuss how our findings build upon and extend prior re-
search within the domain of regret.
Prior research has identified a variety of factors that affect the
intensity of regret. Early accounts emphasized the role of comparing
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the decision outcome to outcomes associated with forgone options
(e.g., Bell, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Loomes & Sugden,
1982; Savage, 1951) while more recent research also identified that
the justifiability of the process is important in understanding regret.
That is, people often regret the choice process leading to a decision,
even when the outcome is good (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002;
Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2005; Reb & Connolly, 2010; Zeelenberg &
Pieters, 2007). However, in understanding the dynamics of regret,
the abovementioned research has primarily focused on two distinct
phases in the overall decision-making process. First, a pre-decisional
phase in which regret is associated with the decision process and
second, a post-outcome phase in which regret originates in com-
paring the decision outcome to the outcome of forgone options. Our
results extend these findings by demonstrating that the intermediate
period between a decision and its outcome is also of vital importance
and research only recently began to recognize this notion. For ex-
ample, Kirkebøen et al. (2013) demonstrated that people who revised
their decision during these time periods experience more regret than
those who chose the wrong option directly (see also, Kirkebøen &
Teigen, 2011). We build upon these findings by showing that that
even a brief instance of doubt during this period impacts the in-
tensity of a person’s regret when the outcome is revealed.
Although decisions often result in doubt and regret, research has
largely ignored how these experiences are related. We suspect that
this lack of attention is partly due to the (erroneous) assumption that
post-decisional doubt forms an integral part of the regret profile. For
example, the most widely used regret scale (i.e., the 5-items regret
scale by Schwartz et al., 2002) includes an item that is more related
to the experience of post-decisional doubt in our opinion (‘Once I
make a decision, I don’t look back’). Including this item in the scale
suggests, however, that theorists assume that post-decisional doubt is
a defining feature of the experience of regret. Our results suggest
otherwise and the findings of the first pilot study support this notion
by highlighting how both experiences differ in their experiential
content. The experience of post-decisional doubt is thus a process
that is strongly associated to the intensity of regret but should be
treated differently.
9.2. Practical implications
Regret, both experienced and anticipated, strongly affects deci-
sion making in various domains. That is, because regret is such an
aversive emotion, it has been shown to influence investment deci-
sions (Strahilevitz et al., 2011), risk preferences in the context of
negotiations (Larrick & Boles, 1995), trust decisions (Martinez &
Zeelenberg, 2015), and the persistence of individuals and
organizations to continue investing valuable resources in failing
courses of action (Wong & Kwong, 2007; Ku, 2008). For that reason,
it is of vital importance to understand how other decision-related
experiences, such as doubt, affect the intensity of regret. Because
people experience more regret when they start doubting their deci-
sion, the negative consequences of regret can be attenuated by re-
ducing this type of doubt. For example, in the context of organiza-
tions, reliable decision making tools like decision support systems
(Stadtler, 2005), statistical forecasting tools (Goodwin & Fildes,
1999), or expert advisors (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001) should reduce
a decision-maker’s degree of doubt in one’s decision (and subsequent
regret when the decision turns out to be less optimal). However,
although lowering post-decisional doubt reduces the intensity of
regret, there are also potential negative consequences. Specifically, if
decision-makers have an intuition about the relationship between
post-decisional doubt and regret, the desire to regulate and prevent
regret could lead them to avoid important, conflicting information
that may undermine their decision after a decision has been reached.
While this strategy is successful in reducing post-decisional doubt
(and thus regret when the negative outcome is revealed), the risk of
having employees who are willingly ignorant may pose a serious
threat to an organization.
10. Conclusion
Although doubt and regret often accompany one another in our
decisions, research has remained mute with respect to how these ex-
periences are related. The present research is an initial step towards
understanding this relationship by studying how various types of doubt
affect the intensity of a person’s regret. Open questions for future re-
search are (1) whether a prior experience of regret, in turn, affects a
person’s degree of doubt in subsequent decisions, (2) whether these
instances of doubt also affect other prototypical decision-related emo-
tions like disappointment, and (3) whether the relationship between
doubt and regret interacts with dispositional traits like the tendency to
maximize (Schwartz et al., 2002), neuroticism (Goldberg, 1992;
Saucier, 1994), or trait anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, &
Jacobs, 1970). On a final note, the experience of doubt plays no role in
classic economic theory as people choose by optimizing. Each choice
alternative has a certain value and decision makers simply select the
alternative with the highest value. As a result, people are assumed to
always choose the best possible option and the experience of post-de-
cisional doubt should therefore be a rarity according to this account.
Our findings cast doubt on this premise by showing that such doubts
occur frequently and have widespread consequences on how people
respond to the outcome of decisions.
Appendix A
To obtain a deeper understanding of the effect of post-decisional doubt on regret, we also ran some additional, exploratory analyses (please note
that these exploratory analyses were preregistered). Specifically, directly after answering the trivia-question, we asked participants whether their
answer was a complete random guess or to a certain extent an informed decision.12 In total, 71 participants indicated that their answer was a random
guess while 191 participants indicated it to be an informed decision. We were interested if the effect of doubt on regret would differ between these
two groups of participants.
As presented in the Table A1 (upper- vs. lower panel), including doubt to the model at stage 2 significantly improved the model when
participants made an informed decision (ΔR2 = .08; p < .001), but not when their answer was a complete random guess (ΔR2 = .05; p= .06).
Although randomly choosing a choice alternative induces doubt, this evidently did not feed into the experience of regret when learning the
poor outcome. These results suggest that doubt originating from different sources impacts the intensity of regret differently. A possible reason
for this finding might be that doubt impacts regret only for decisions for which people feel responsible, but not for choices in which doubt
originates from a random process. Nonetheless, the exact reason underlying this pattern remains unclear and future research could address this
interesting finding in more detail.
12We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this distinction.
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Appendix B
Below first the ‘home scenario’ as used in Study 6. In the control condition, participants learned that Time decided to move whereas John decided
not to move. In our second condition {between braces}, participants learned that Tim never questioned his decision for a minute whereas John
started doubting his decision to move. In our third condition [between brackets], participants learned that Tim started doubting his decision not to
move while John never questioned his decision to move for a minute.
Tim owns a home in ‘Bellville’. During the past year he considered selling his house in order to move to ‘Starville’. Tim decided not to move {and
never questioned his decision for a minute} [but started questioning whether he made the right decision]. Today he finds out that the value of his
house in Belleville has decreased by 10% while the average value of houses in Starville increased by 10%.
John owned a home in ‘Starville’. During the past year he considered selling his house in order to move to ‘Bellville’. John decided to move {but
started questioning whether he made the right decision} [and never questioned his decision for a minute]. Today he finds out that the value of his
house in Belleville has decreased by 10% while the average value of houses in Starville increased by 10%.
Below the ‘hotel scenario’ as used in Study 6, that follows the same logic.
Paul planned a trip to India and he booked a room at the The New Delhi. During the past month he considered switching to an adjacent hotel, The
Bombay, which has identical room rates. Paul decided not to switch {and he never questioned his decision for a minute} [but started questioning
whether he made the right decision]. Upon arrival he learns that The New Delhi is not that great while The Bombay is very comfortable.
George also planned a trip to India and he booked a room at The Bombay. During the past month he considered switching to an adjacent hotel,
The New Delhi. George decided to switch {but started questioning whether he made the right decision} [and he never questioned his decision for
a minute]. Upon arrival he learns that The New Delhi is not that great while The Bombay is very comfortable.
Appendix C. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.08.006.
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